The authors studied the effects of recipients' prior attitudes on message scrutiny in minority and majority influence situations. Based on the objective consensus approach and on conversion theory, the authors derived the hypothesis that cognitive effort dedicated to the processing of minority and majority communications depends on recipients' prior attitudes. In Experiment 1, prior attitudes were experimentally induced, and in Experi
Attitude judgments at least partially depend on the effort recipients invest in the processing of persuasive messages (e.g., Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986 ). An important aspect in explaining minority and majority influence, therefore, deals with the question of whether minority or majority advocacy induces greater scrutiny of message content (e.g., Baker & Petty, 1994; Erb, Bohner, Schmälzle, & Rank, 1998; Mackie, 1987; Moscovici, 1980; Nemeth, 1986) . In research on Mackie's (1987) objective consensus approach, majority sources were found to instigate more extensive scrutiny of their arguments when compared to minority sources. According to this approach, a majority source informs the recipient that the forwarded position is valid ("high consensus implies correctness") and therefore directs attention to the majority's message. This seems difficult to reconcile with Moscovici's (1980 Moscovici's ( , 1985 conversion theory where more extensive scrutiny of minority messages was predicted and found. The contradiction points to the possibility that moderating factors have to be taken into account (Wood, Lundgren, Ouellette, Busceme, & Blackstone, 1994, p. 337) . In what follows, we examine the effects of recipients' prior attitudes on message scrutiny in minority and majority influence situations. We hypothesize that a moderate prior attitude leads to more extensive processing of majority messages, whereas opposing prior attitudes lead to more extensive processing of minority messages.
According to Mackie's (1987) objective consensus approach, the majority position "is accepted as reflecting objective reality" (Mackie, 1987, p. 42) . A related argument has been put forward by Kelley (1967) , according to whom high consensus makes people "know that they know" and promotes entity attributions (i.e., concern with the issue rather than the source). Similar to the effects of high credibility sources on processing (e.g., Heesacker, Petty, & Cacioppo, 1983) , confrontation with a viewpoint likely to be correct will increase concern with the objective truth value of the issue. In turn, recipients' attention will be directed to the majority message, which results in extensive processing. A minority, on the other hand, lacks objective consensus; hence, minority messages will be processed less extensively.
Seemingly, Mackie's objective consensus approach is at odds with Moscovici's conversion theory. Moscovici (1980) proposed that under majority influence, recipients engage in a comparison process whereby they compare their own attitude with the conflicting attitude proposed by the majority. This process is one of social comparison guided by the question, "Why do I not see or think like them?" (Moscovici, 1980, p. 214) . As far as the social conflict between the majority and the recipient's own deviant position is the focus of concern, message content will be of low importance and processed rather superficially. On the other hand, minority influence is guided by the question, "How can it (the minority) see what it sees, think what it thinks?" (Moscovici, 1980, p. 215) . Other than social conflict, such informational conflict leads to an active validation process in which issue-relevant information processing prevails. Hence, the minority message will be scrutinized extensively, and it is this extensive processing that leads to conversion (see also Maass & Clark, 1984; Nemeth, 1986) .
More recent research on the question has focused on other variables determining message scrutiny. For example, information about the source's minority or majority status can be used as a means to save cognitive energy in processing subsequent messages (Erb et al., 1998) . Under conditions where recipients held no prior attitudes and the influence groups as well as the attitude issues were of low relevance to them, recipients used such consensus information to form an initial judgment about the quality of the persuasive attempt, positive (negative) in response to a majority (minority) source. Consistent with research that demonstrated energysaving effects of heuristics and general knowledge structures (e.g., Chaiken et al., 1989) , the initial reaction reduced cognitive effort dedicated to both the minority and the majority message. Thus, when compared to processing effort in a control condition where consensus information was not available, both minority and majority support were found to reduce effort under such impoverished circumstances that do not otherwise foster or prevent message scrutiny (see also Chaiken & Maheswaran, 1994) .
In other research, Baker and Petty (1994) studied effects of the unexpectedness of the source's position. When students learned that a majority favored or only a minority opposed a mandatory program committing students to a 2-year community service, they were surprised at this obvious source-position imbalance. Surprise, in turn, fostered message scrutiny. When students learned that a majority disapproved or only a minority approved of the proposal, the source-position relation was balanced and messages were less extensively processed. Thus, "either majority or minority endorsement can enhance message scrutiny if the source-position pairing is surprising" (Baker & Petty, 1994, p. 5) . These findings resemble earlier research on the effects that other conditions of imbalance can have on processing effort (e.g., Maheswaran & Chaiken, 1991) .
The diversity of findings reported in these studies yield important but also seemingly conflicting findings. To us, they confirm Mackie and Hunter's (1999) conclusion that it might be fruitless to search for a theory that predicts higher message scrutiny for either majority or minority sources under any circumstances (see also Erb & Bohner, 2001; Kruglanski & Mackie, 1990) . Rather, these conflicting findings point to the fact that situational variables have to be taken into account. In the present article, we focus on the effect that prior attitudes can have on processing effort in minority and majority communications.
Prior Attitudes and Processing Effort
In theorizing and empirical testing of conversion theory, conflict between recipients' prior attitudes and the position proposed by the influence group plays a decisive role. The amount of conflict is closely related to the degree to which the recipient engages in social comparison or content validation: "The more severe the conflict, the more likely [conflict resolution] is to follow the more available path, if the other is blocked" (Moscovici, 1980, pp. 215-216) . That is, the stronger the conflict introduced by the majority, the more likely the recipient focuses on the social consequences of his or her deviant position by increasing neglect of issue-related processing. The more conflict with a minority source, the more the recipient is expected to engage in validation of issue-relevant information, resulting in conversion.
Empirical tests of conversion theory confirmed that information attributed to a minority was processed more extensively than information attributed to a majority. Furthermore, an increase in conflict through rigidity in argumentation, consistency in behavioral style, and higher numerical strength of the minority fostered conversion mediated by issue-related thinking. These effects were studied under conditions of strong discrepancies between recipients' prior attitudes and the position forwarded by the influence group (cf. Mugny, 1975 , for the only exception we were able to find). Such discrepancies arose from conflicting judgments in a color perception task where a minority insisted on naming blue-colored slides green (e.g., Moscovici, Lage, & Naffrechoux, 1969;  but see Martin, 1998) or from persuasive messages that collided with important values, for example, about environmental protection in European students of the late 1970s (Moscovici, 1980) . Conflict does not play any role in Mackie's (1987) objective consensus view of majority influence. The perception that the majority reflects objective reality should be independent of the discrepancy between recipients' prior attitudes and the position forwarded in the message. Mackie used premeasures to distinguish between participants who strongly or mildly (dis)agreed with the minority or the majority position. Consistent with her argument, the level of (dis)agreement was found to be unrelated to processing effort. Unfortunately from the perspective of the present analysis, Mackie used premeasures of attitudes to determine whether her participants were exposed to minority or majority influence. That is, if a participant's premeasure was opposed to the majority's position (and therefore in concordance with the minority), he or she was treated as being exposed to majority influence, and vice versa. Although this method has advantages in other respects, it prevents a direct test of the hypothesis derived from the objective consensus approach that majority messages receive higher processing effort than minority messages independent of prior attitudes (for related discussions, see Baker & Petty, 1994; Chaiken & Stangor, 1987) .
To explain the main effect of more scrutiny for the majority message in Mackie's studies and its divergence from Moscovici's findings, we may speculate that the attitudes used in Mackie's experiments were likely not related to strong convictions on part of the recipients. The issues (e.g., "the U.S. should act to ensure a military balance in the Western hemisphere") were relatively unfamiliar to her participants. Therefore, the situation was not likely to induce strong conflict when compared to situations where one's own color perception ability or deep concern with environmental issues are challenged. In addition, the fact that participants in Mackie's studies were subjected to both minority and majority sources and their (pro and con) messages may have constituted a rather ambiguous situation where prior attitudes were not in strong conflict with the information provided (see Chaiken & Maheswaran, 1994, p. 462 , for a similar discussion of Mackie's studies). Accordingly, the conflict with prior attitudes (if any) that participants in Mackie's studies experienced was probably less severe than in Moscovici's studies.
To state it otherwise, high conviction in prior attitudes in Moscovici's studies gave rise to conflict-related processes and undermined effects of objective consensus. The lack of strong prior attitudes in Mackie's studies allowed the perception to prevail that the majority's view is probably correct. The perception that high consensus implies correctness may therefore direct attention to the majority message only if the recipient is relatively open-minded, not when he or she is strongly committed to a judgment that has already been formed prior to the influence attempt. On the other hand, when conflict is of major concern, the social comparison with the opposing majority prevents message processing; the majority message will not receive much attention. Rather, conflict fosters message processing under minority influence.
On the basis of this analysis, we propose that the seemingly contradictory findings by Mackie and Moscovici can be reconciled by taking into account the discrepancy between the source's position and the recipient's prior attitude. Under conditions of high discrepancy (i.e., if recipients hold an opposing prior attitude), social concern with deviance from a majority position prevails, hindering the cognitive elaboration of issue-relevant information. Disagreement with a minority, on the other hand, is likely to evoke extensive processing (Moscovici, 1980) . Conversely, under conditions of low or no discrepancy (i.e., if recipients hold a moderate attitude), the perception that majorities represent objective consensus prevails. Accordingly, recipients engage in extensive processing of the majority message. Because the minority is seen to represent a view of low validity, interest in their arguments is diminished and their message will be processed less extensively (Mackie, 1987) . STUDY 1 In an initial test of these predictions, participants were presented a message about a construction project. Specifically, it was proposed to build a tunnel to connect their home city more closely with a neighboring city situated across a river. We used this topic for several reasons. First, such a project had never actually been discussed; therefore, an experimental manipulation of prior attitudes could be performed without interference of attitudes existing prior to the experiment. Second, we reasoned that a fictitious issue could not be accompanied with expectations about source-position imbalance, thus preventing surprise (Baker & Petty, 1994) .
1 Third, a large-scale tunnel construction in their home city would not be totally irrelevant for participants (Erb et al., 1998) .
Participants received source information (minority vs. majority) and a persuasive message that argued in favor of building the tunnel. We also manipulated argument quality as a means to assess message scrutiny. Under conditions of high message scrutiny, attitude judgments are expected to reflect the manipulation of argument quality. This method was introduced by Petty, Wells, and Brock (1976) and has since been used in a wide variety of studies in response to conceptual problems with other measures (Baker & Petty, 1994, pp. 6-7; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986, chap. 2) . In this experiment, we varied argument quality within the persuasive message, using strong and weak arguments as a within-subjects factor (see Erb et al., 1998, for details) . This enabled us to obtain individual measures of message scrutiny, which consisted of the difference in attitudes toward the weak and strong aspects of the message. Our major expectation was that recipients with moderate prior attitudes would show greater message scrutiny under majority than minority influence, whereas recipients with an opposing prior attitude would differentiate more between weak and strong aspects under minority rather than majority influence.
Method PARTICIPANTS AND PROCEDURE
Participants included 114 male students at the University of Mannheim, Germany, who attended in small group sessions. The design was a 2 (prior attitude: moderate vs. opposing) × 2 (source status: minority vs. majority) × 2 (argument quality: weak vs. strong) factorial with prior attitude and source status as between-subjects factors and argument quality as a within-subjects factor. Students were randomly assigned to one of the betweensubjects conditions. They first read a two-page booklet that conveyed the manipulation of prior attitudes. In the context of an alleged opinion survey, they received one of two fictitious articles about a projected tunnel for road traffic underneath the river Rhine whose construction was said to be planned for the following year. After reading this article, the students wrote down their opinion about this topic and then received another alleged article about the tunnel containing the persuasive message. The message was ascribed to either a majority or a minority who favored the tunnel project. Afterward, participants completed the dependent measures (see below) and an open-ended suspicion probe, were debriefed, and were paid 8 German marks (approximately U.S.$4) for their participation.
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
Prior attitudes. To induce opposing or moderate premessage attitudes, respondents read one of two articles on the tunnel issue. To induce moderate attitudes, one version of the article addressed the aspects of the tunnel project in even-handed, open terms. Possible long-term effects of the tunnel project were discussed, concluding that it was important to consider both its assets and its liabilities. To induce opposing attitudes, in the other version of the article, aspects of the tunnel were addressed by pointing out detrimental consequences of building the tunnel for the community, concluding that it was necessary to oppose the project.
Respondents were asked to write down within 2 min their initial opinion about the tunnel project, to enhance their commitment to the induced attitude. Then they indicated their agreement with the statement that the tunnel should be built on a 9-point attitude scale (-4 = do not agree at all to +4 = completely agree, midpoint 0 = not explicitly labeled). In a pretest (N = 30), students who had read the opposing article had indicated opposition to the tunnel (M = -1.93, SD = 2.09), whereas students who had read the neutral article had expressed a moderate attitude (M = +0.43, SD = 2.47), t(27) = 2.79, p < .02.
Minority versus majority source status. Next, participants were informed about the alleged result of a local discussion meeting on the tunnel project. They learned that a minority of 13% (vs. a majority of 87%) of those attending had favored the tunnel and had stated arguments that would be reported in the following article. The consensus information was repeated at the top of that article.
Persuasive message. The mixed message contained five arguments in favor of the tunnel project that varied in quality. The second argument was strong; it addressed advantages for residents. The fourth argument was weak; it highlighted economical benefits. The remaining arguments were moderate in persuasiveness; they dealt with ecological advantages and accident reduction. These differences in argument quality had been ascertained in extensive pilot testing (see Erb et al., 1998 , for details).
DEPENDENT VARIABLES
Manipulation checks. After reading the first article, which was designed to induce prior attitudes, the students indicated on a 9-point scale whether the tunnel should be built in the following year (-4 = do not agree at all to 4 = totally agree). At the conclusion of the questionnaire, participants indicated in an open-response format what percentage of people at the discussion meeting supported the project.
Postmessage attitudes. Participants indicated on 9-point scales (1 = do not agree at all to 9 = totally agree, midpoint not labeled) their agreement with one general statement ("The Rhine tunnel should be built next year") and three specific statements that pertained to the strong and weak aspects and one moderate aspect of the message, respectively ("The tunnel constitutes a facilitation for residents," " . . . is economically useful," and " . . . is advantageous for the environment"). 
Results
Analyses are based on 94 respondents because 18 students expressed suspicion about various aspects of the design and 2, who were nonnative speakers, reported problems with understanding the stimulus texts. Drop-out rate was independent of experimental condition, χ 2 (3, N = 114) = 2.00, p > .57, and control analyses with the whole sample did not yield any decisive discrepancies with the data reported below. The data were submitted to 2 (prior attitude: moderate vs. opposing) × 2 (source status: minority vs. majority) ANOVAs; attitudes toward weak versus strong aspects of the message were analyzed using argument quality as an additional two-level within-subjects factor.
MANIPULATION CHECKS
Prior attitudes. Replicating pilot results, respondents in the opposing conditions initially reported an unfavorable attitude (M = -2.04, SD = 2.13), whereas respondents in the neutral conditions expressed a moderate attitude (M = +0.66, SD = 2.61), F(1, 90) = 30.22, p < .001; for all other effects, F < 1. Thus, the manipulation of prior attitudes was successful.
Source status. In line with the manipulation, participants in the minority condition estimated that 17.00% (SD = 1.93) had favored the tunnel project, whereas participants in the majority condition estimated a percentage of 81.87% (SD = 5.29), F(1, 89) = 6,250.01, p < .001; for all other effects, F < 1. Thus, the minority (majority) position was correctly perceived.
MAJOR DEPENDENT VARIABLES
Postmessage attitudes toward strong and weak aspects. In a mixed-model ANOVA with prior attitudes and consensus as between-subjects factors and argument quality as a within-subjects factor, a main effect of argument quality, F(1, 89) = 57.42, p < .001, was qualified by a two-way interaction of prior attitudes and argument quality, F(1, 89) = 3.66, p < .06, and by the predicted three-way interaction of argument quality, prior attitude, and consensus, F(1, 89) = 4.24, p < .05; for all other effects, F < 1. Overall, students with moderate attitudes tended to process the message more extensively than opposing students. More important, as predicted, moderate respondents processed the majority message more extensively than the minority message; conversely, respondents in the opposing condition processed the minority message more extensively than the majority message (Table 1) . To ascertain that participants who mildly disagreed would not differ in their reactions from those who mildly agreed, we conducted a median split analysis in the moderate attitude condition. This ANOVA did not reveal any difference in processing effort between these groups; for the three-way interaction, F < 1.
Postmessage attitude index. The four attitude items were averaged into an attitude index (α = .73). Students with opposing prior attitudes generally agreed less with the forwarded position (M = 4.13, SD = 1.58) than did students with moderate prior attitudes (M = 5.20, SD = 1.76), F(1, 89) = 9.56, p < .004; for all other effects, F < 1.
Discussion
In this study, participants distinguished their attitude judgments toward aspects of a persuasive message that pertained to either a weak or a strong argument more when moderate prior attitudes met majority source information and when an opposing prior attitude met minority source information. The marginally significant two-way interaction additionally obtained points to the possibility that participants who held an opposing attitude were generally less likely to engage in message processing when compared to recipients who held moderate prior attitudes, but this does not invalidate our conclusion. Thus, the results support our hypothesis: When participants held moderate prior attitudes, we observed a pattern exactly as predicted by the objective consensus view. On the other hand, under conditions of conflicting prior attitudes, we observed a pattern as predicted by conversion theory.
The postmessage attitude index only varied as a function of prior attitude induction. An effect of majority or minority information on these attitudes was not obtained. There are two aspects of our operationalizations that likely prevented a direct effect of majority or minority source information on attitudes to occur. First, message exposure immediately followed the induction of prior attitudes where participants were asked to give their attitude judgments. Participants may therefore have felt reluctant to change their attitudes so they would appear consistent. Second, across conditions, participants distinguished in their attitudes toward specific aspects of the message between weak and strong arguments, indicating relatively high processing effort. Under conditions of high processing effort, however, a direct effect of consensus information on attitudes is rather unlikely (see considerations of trade-off between central and peripheral route processing, Petty & Cacioppo, 1986 ; or the heuristic-systematic model's attenuation hypothesis, Bohner, Moskowitz, & Chaiken, 1995; Chen & Chaiken, 1999) . The results of this experiment can therefore be regarded as initial evidence for our hypothesis of enhanced scrutiny of a minority (majority) message under conditions of opposing (moderate) prior attitudes. A second experiment seemed desirable to demonstrate that the effects could be replicated using different procedures.
STUDY 2
In Experiment 2, the topic we used was the fluoridation of drinking water. The fluoridation topic was chosen for several reasons. First, fluoridation of drinking water would not be totally irrelevant to our participants (Erb et al., 1998) . Second, the topic was not concurrently discussed in public at the time of data collection (in Germany, drinking water is not fluoridated). Participants would therefore not have strong expectations as to what the minority's or majority's position toward that issue was-expectations that might have been contradicted, causing surprise and its effects on processing effort (Baker & Petty, 1994 ; see Note 1). Third, pilot testing had shown that attitudes toward this topic were distributed in a bi-modal shape, that is, most participants either strongly opposed the fluoridation proposal or were rather moderate.
Participants read a message containing either weak or strong arguments that was favored by either a minority or a majority. The main dependent variables were attitudes toward the message's topic and the valence of participants' cognitive responses. Both dependent variables were predicted to yield a parallel three-way interaction, with a strong effect of argument quality in the minority/opposing attitude and in the majority/moderate attitude conditions. We also predicted that in the conditions where message scrutiny was expected to be high, the influence of argument quality on participants' attitudes would be mediated through their cognitive responses to the message.
Method PARTICIPANTS AND PROCEDURE
Participants included 110 female students at the University of Heidelberg, Germany, who attended in small group sessions. The design was a 2 (prior attitude: clearly opposed vs. moderate) × 2 (consensus: minority vs. majority) × 2 (argument quality: weak vs. strong) between-subjects factorial. Assignment to the prior attitude factor was based on a pretest measure of attitude (see below), whereas assignment to the remaining factors was random.
Participants learned that the experimental session contained two independent studies. First, as part of a survey on current topics, prior attitudes toward the target topic were assessed. The alleged second study was said to deal with the evaluation of local print media. Later, participants completed a questionnaire that contained the dependent variables (see below). After responding to an open-ended suspicion probe, they were debriefed and were paid 5 German marks (approximately U.S.$2.50).
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
Prior attitudes. As part of the alleged survey, participants' prior attitude toward the fluoridation issue was assessed ("To prevent dental cavity, fluoride should be added to drinking water"; scale from 1 = totally disagree to 9 = totally agree, midpoint not labeled), embedded among attitude items on 14 different topics that served as fillers. Pretesting (N = 38) had shown that attitudes toward fluoridation in this population were negative overall (M = 3.74) but showed considerable variation (SD = 2.32) and were distributed in a bimodal shape such that most participants either strongly opposed the issue or were moderate. In the main experiment, the prior attitude toward fluoridation was similarly distributed as in the pretests (M = 3.72, SD = 2.49). Groups of participants holding a clearly opposing prior attitude (M = 1.49, SD = 0.78) versus moderate prior attitude (M = 5.96, SD = 1.59) could thus be formed using a median split (Mdn = 3.00).
Minority versus majority source status. Next, participants were informed about the alleged result of a discussion meeting held by elected representatives of public health insurance plans. It was said that at this meeting a minority of 12% (vs. a majority of 88%) favored the fluoridation of drinking water and stated arguments that would be reported in an article (the persuasive message). The source's minority or majority status was repeated in the opening sentence of that article.
Persuasive message. The message contained either four weak or four strong arguments in favor of the fluoridation of drinking water. Independent pilot testing (N = 32) had shown that the strong message was rated higher in persuasiveness (M = 5.00, SD = 2.29) and led to greater agreement (M = 5.29, SD = 2.17) than the weak message (M = 3.40, SD = 1.55, and M = 3.33, SD = 2.46, respectively), F(1, 30) = 5.20 and 5.71, respectively, all ps < .04 (9-point scales).
DEPENDENT VARIABLES
Cognitive responses. After reading the message, participants were asked to list within 3 min all of the thoughts they had had while reading. Two independent judges who were blind to conditions subsequently categorized each thought as (a) favorable, (b) unfavorable, (c) neutral, or (d) irrelevant to the fluoridation proposal.
Attitudes. Participants indicated on 9-point scales (1 = do not agree at all to 9 = totally agree, midpoint not labeled) their agreement with three statements about fluoridation: "Drinking water should be fluoridated for the prevention of dental cavity," "Fluoridation of drinking water is beneficial for health," and "By the fluoridation of drinking water dental cavity can be clearly reduced"). Three further attitude items consisted of 9-point bipolar scales: "Fluoridation of drinking water is . . . bad-good; detrimental-beneficial; not useful-very useful." 3 Manipulation checks. Participants rated how convincing the message's arguments were in general (1 = not at all convincing to 9 = totally convincing). Respondents also judged the position of the majority on a scale from 1 = strongly opposing fluoridation to 9 = strongly in favor of fluoridation and estimated the percentage of representatives who supported fluoridation, in an open-ended response format.
Results
None of the students reported any suspicion or language difficulty. Thus, the data of all 110 participants were submitted to 2 (prior attitude: strongly opposed vs. moderate) × 2 (consensus: minority vs. majority) × 2 (argument quality: weak vs. strong) ANOVAs.
MANIPULATION CHECKS
Perceived consensus. Respondents in the minority conditions (M = 2.44, SD = 2.14) rated the majority to be strongly opposed to fluoridation, and respondents in the majority conditions (M = 8.43, SD = 0.72) rated the majority to be strongly in favor, F(1, 101) = 367.39, p < .001. 4 Moreover, respondents in the minority condition estimated that 12.46% (SD = 2.85) favored fluoridation, whereas respondents in the majority condition estimated that 86.81% (SD = 5.09) supported fluoridation, F(1, 102) = 8,604.15, p < .001; for all other effects, p > .11. Thus, the minority (majority) position was correctly perceived.
Argument persuasiveness. Two main effects were significant. As expected, strong arguments were perceived as more convincing (M = 4.72, SD = 2.26) than weak arguments (M = 3.85, SD = 2.33), F(1, 101) = 4.75, p < .04. In addition, not surprisingly, students with an opposing prior attitude generally rated the arguments as less convincing (M = 3.70, SD = 2.29) than did students with a moderate prior attitude (M = 4.94, SD = 2.21), F(1, 101) = 9.06, p < .005. Thus, the manipulation of argument quality also proved successful.
MAJOR DEPENDENT VARIABLES
Attitudes. We combined the six attitude items into an index (α = .91). As predicted, a main effect of prior attitude, F(1, 100) = 89.71, p < .001, was qualified by a three-way interaction of prior attitude, consensus, and argument quality, F(1, 100) = 6.70, p < .02; for all other effects, p > .18 (Table 2 , upper half). Opposing students agreed less with the fluoridation (M = 3.22, SD = 1.34) than did students with a moderate prior attitude (M = 5.76, SD = 1.53). As predicted, a priori comparisons showed that moderate respondents agreed more with strong rather than weak arguments when they came from a majority, t(100) = 2.20, p < .02 (one-tailed). In contrast, when a minority endorsed the arguments, respondents with a moderate prior attitude were not affected by argument quality, t(100) = -1.11, ns. Conversely, opposing respondents agreed more with strong rather than weak arguments that came from a minority, t(100) = 1.91, p < .03 (one-tailed), but when a majority endorsed the arguments, these respondents were not affected by argument quality, t < 1. As in Experiment 1, a median split analysis confirmed that there was no difference in processing in the moderate condition between those who mildly agreed and those who mildly disagreed, for the three-way interaction, F < 1.
Thought valence. For each respondent, an index of thought valence was computed by subtracting the proportion of unfavorable thoughts from the proportion of favorable thoughts. Interjudge agreement for this variable was high (r = .71, p < .001) and data were averaged across judges ( opposing prior attitude generated less favorable thoughts (M = -.48, SD = .31) than did moderate students (M = -.29, SD = .38), F(1, 101) = 8.12, p < .006. More important, as predicted, this main effect was qualified by a three-way interaction of prior attitude, consensus, and argument quality, F(1, 101) = 4.25, p < .05; for all other effects, p > .10. Participants with a moderate prior attitude who were exposed to a majority message generated more favorable thoughts in response to strong rather than weak arguments, t(101) = 2.09, p < .02 (one-tailed), but no such difference emerged for moderate participants who read minority arguments, t < 1. Conversely, opposing participants who read a minority message produced more favorable thoughts when this message contained strong rather than weak arguments, t(101) = 1.82, p < .04 (one-tailed), whereas for opposing students who read majority arguments, thought valence did not differ as a function of argument quality, t < 1.
REGRESSION ANALYSES
To explore the mediation of the effect of argument quality on attitudes, separate regression analyses were conducted for the conditions where high processing effort was predicted (majority/moderate prior attitude; minority/opposing prior attitude) and for the conditions where low processing effort was predicted (minority/moderate prior attitude; majority/opposing prior attitude), respectively. The predictor variables in these analyses were argument quality (coded 0 = weak, 1 = strong) and the valenced thought measure; the dependent variable was the attitude index. Following suggestions by Baron and Kenny (1986) , we tested whether the effect of argument quality on the attitude index was mediated by the valence of participants' message-related thoughts.
As predicted, in the conditions where high message scrutiny was expected (minority/opposing; majority/ moderate), argument quality predicted valenced messagerelated thoughts (β = .31, p < .04), which in turn predicted attitudes (β = .40, p < .002). Furthermore, argument quality significantly predicted the attitude index (β = .26, p < .05), and this effect was reduced if valenced thoughts were included in the analysis (β = .15, ns). This indicates that the effect of argument quality on attitudes was mediated via message-related thinking (Z = 2.63, p < .009, Sobel test). The picture is different in the remaining conditions (minority/moderate; majority/opposing): Although attitudes were significantly predicted by valenced thoughts (β = .54, p < .001), neither participants' thoughts (β = -.05, ns) nor their attitudes (β = -.12, ns) were affected by argument quality. This pattern indicates that message processing was low in these conditions.
Discussion
The three-way interaction of prior attitude, consensus, and argument quality on attitudes clearly supported our hypothesis. The judgments of moderate participants were influenced by argument quality only when the source was said to be a majority but not when it was said to be a minority. Under conditions of opposing prior attitudes, this pattern reversed. The basic finding of Experiment 1 replicated with a between-subjects manipulation of argument quality, a different attitude object, a different influence group, and a different method regarding the manipulation/assessment of prior attitudes. 5 In Experiment 2, our hypothesis was further confirmed by the predicted three-way interaction of all independent variables on thought-listing measures. In addition, regression analyses demonstrated that the effect of argument quality on attitudes was mediated by messagerelated thoughts only under conditions where extensive message processing was predicted. Such mediation is indicative of extensive message processing.
Again, a direct effect of source information on attitudes was not obtained. Generally, participants may have felt reluctant to change their prior attitudes for reasons of consistency. More specifically, we would expect to see an effect of source information only under conditions of relatively low effort in message processing because high processing effort likely attenuates effects of source information on attitudes (Bohner et al., 1995; Chaiken et al., 1989; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) . These are the conditions of opposing attitudes and majority influence, as well as moderate attitudes and minority influence. Thus, the direct effect of source information cannot be tested independent of prior attitudes. Yet, given the relatively favorable attitude judgments for the minority and the relatively unfavorable judgments for the majority under these conditions, it appears that the consistency effect of prior attitudes prevailed even under conditions of shallow message processing. The strong influence of prior attitudes on a number of different measures (see also Note 3) is likely due to the fact that participants indicated their prior attitudes right before being exposed to the experimental material. Still, under conditions where we predicted extensive message processing, attitude judgments as well as thought valence additionally reflected argument quality consistent with our hypothesis. Thus, the study supported the hypothesis that moderate recipients process a majority message more extensively than a minority message and opposing recipients process a minority message more extensively than a majority message. GENERAL DISCUSSION In two studies, participants' effort in the processing of persuasive messages was an interactive function of their prior attitudes and minority or majority source information. The effect that a minority message was processed more extensively than a majority message when recipients held an opposing prior attitude is in accordance with Moscovici's conversion theory and adds to empirical findings supporting this approach (e.g., Moscovici, 1980; Nemeth, 1986) . However, conflict is not necessarily involved in every influence attempt by minorities or majorities (Erb & Bohner, 2001; Kruglanski & Mackie, 1990) . From this perspective, our studies add to the literature by demonstrating that conditions of no conflict are also worthy of being studied and may trigger different patterns of processing effort. Specifically, when recipients held moderate attitudes, the effects we observed were in accordance with Mackie's (1987) objective consensus approach. In Mackie's work, the use of unfamiliar attitude objects as well as presenting both sides of the issue may have produced a situation similar to the one in which our participants with moderate attitudes found themselves. The lack of attitude discrepancy diminished any effects of conflict and gave rise to objective consensus effects on message scrutiny.
Hence, our research reconciles the seemingly contradictory findings by Moscovici and Mackie. The components of both theories that deal with minority and majority source effects on processing effort seem to be applicable only to specific conditions of either low or high conflict with the source's position. Yet, this does by no means tell the full story. As reviewed above, surprise at obvious source-position imbalance (Baker & Petty, 1994) can enhance the processing of both minority and majority messages. Under conditions where recipients hold no prior attitudes and the attitude object as well as influence groups are of low relevance, both minority and majority source information can reduce cognitive effort dedicated to their messages (Erb et al., 1998) . Thus, the question of whether minorities or majorities instigate more processing effort can only be answered by taking into account the specific circumstances of the influence situation. The present findings demonstrated the important role of one such variable, namely, conflict with prior attitudes.
To date, the psychological mechanisms underlying the effects of conflict and objective consensus on message processing are not yet well understood. In Mackie's research, objective consensus remained a theoretical construct. It has never been varied in any other way than providing low or high consensus. In future research, objective consensus should therefore be manipulated in other ways. For example, the objective consensus could be undermined through information questioning the validity of the majority's position and/or information that the minority is likely to be correct. Manipulations of this kind can yield a more direct test of the objective consensus hypothesis. Objective consensus effects could then be more clearly distinguished from other effects that may enhance message processing. For example, Mackie (1987) discussed the possibility that a violation of expectancies that are based on false consensus (Ross, Greene, & House, 1977) may additionally foster message processing under majority influence.
As for conversion theory, the role of conflict on message scrutiny was demonstrated by the effects of variables that increase conflict (e.g., Moscovici, 1980) . The finding that under increased conflict recipients process minority messages more extensively, however, leaves the underlying psychological process more or less unrevealed. In this regard, Nemeth's (1986) theorizing may provide useful starting points for further investigations into the mechanisms responsible for conflict effects on processing effort. Her idea that conflict with majorities induces more stress that exerts dysfunctional effects on scrutiny still awaits empirical testing. Similarly, her hypothesis that social conflict is resolved faster and earlier than informational conflict is a highly plausible assumption that warrants closer examination.
More recent theorizing on processing motivation also may prove to be a fruitful approach to these questions. For example, within contemporary models of persuasion, accuracy and defense motivation have been distinguished. According to the heuristic-systematic model (e.g., Bohner et al., 1995; Chaiken et al., 1989; Chen & Chaiken, 1999) , accuracy motivation refers to the goal of holding accurate attitudes. Within this framework, information processing under accuracy concerns has been characterized as "a relatively open-minded and evenhanded treatment of judgment-relevant information" (Chen & Chaiken, 1999, p. 77) . Defense motivation, on the other hand, refers to the goal of preserving and protecting one's own attitudes. If the defense goal predominates, people exhibit selectivity in their processing efforts. Depending on the extent of defense motivation and overall processing capacity, this includes the selective application of heuristics as well as close scrutiny of incongruent information with the aim of derogating its validity (e.g., Ditto & Lopez, 1992; Giner-Sorolla & Chaiken, 1997; Liberman & Chaiken, 1992 ; for discussion, see Chen & Chaiken, 1999) . Conflict with prior attitudes may as well direct attention to information that appears easy to refute (Frey, 1986) . A minority source may thus have the same effect as low competence sources, that is, it may give rise to the expectation that the information provided by the minority can be easily discounted. In turn, this expectation may lead to extensive processing of the minority message, as was found in other research demonstrating high interest in beliefdiscrepant information perceived to be refutable (e.g., Kleinhesselink & Edwards, 1975) .
Within the elaboration likelihood model, Wegener (1998, 1999) have pointed out that accuracy motivation also may be a source of defense in processing. The recipient who is highly convinced that his or her position is correct may well defend this position on the basis of accuracy concerns. One question that arises from this view is whether moderate attitudes lead to enhanced processing of the majority message on the basis of accuracy concerns and the perception that the majority is likely correct. Conversely, diminished processing of the minority message may reflect "defensive inattention" regarding the minority's position caused by the assumption that it cannot help to adopt a correct view. Possibly, both mechanisms operate in parallel, and a critical test would thus involve a control condition of baseline effort. Another aspect refers to the possibility that opposing recipients' negative reactions toward the influence attempt in general as well as their low effort in processing the counterattitudinal majority message may be serving accuracy motives, given that recipients perceive their opposing attitudes to be correct. The finding that more extreme, opposing attitudes are held with higher certainty than are moderate attitudes (e.g., Abelson, 1995) points to the usefulness of such considerations (see also Note 3).
Apart from these theoretical issues, our research also speaks to applied contexts. Not only source information and prior attitudes but also the effect of argument quality on attitudes has to be considered. Of interest, neither Mackie nor Moscovici discussed the possibility that extensive message processing can have unintended effects if the arguments are not convincing. The effect of argument quality we found under conditions of high effort processing, however, adds to the literature demonstrating that argument quality is likely to determine attitudes under such conditions. Thus, for example, a communicator who is able to present strong arguments would be ill advised to emphasize existing majority support if the audience holds opposing views. Under similar conditions, a communicator who enjoys only minority support may wish to stress the fact that (up to now) only few people agree, thus directing attention to his or her message. The opposite strategy is indicated when only weak arguments can be produced or when the audience is undecided to begin with. In this regard, our studies have demonstrated that processing effort dedicated to minority and majority messages depends on the attitudes recipients hold prior to the influence attempt and that processing effects in minority and majority influence situations are by no means independent of the quality of the arguments presented. NOTES 1. We confirmed this reasoning in a control experiment where 68 students were exposed to an alleged survey result. Students were randomly assigned to a 3 (issues) × 2 (minority vs. majority in favor) between-subjects design. The issues included the tunnel project (as used in Experiment 1), the fluoridation issue (see Experiment 2), and the mandatory program issue (as in Baker & Petty, 1994) . With each issue, students received the information that either a minority or a majority was in favor. These descriptions were the same as used in our experiments or a translation from Baker and Petty with slight adjustments for the German student population. Participants responded by indicating how much they felt surprised and astonished as well as how much the survey result had confirmed their expectancies (reverse-scored) on 9-point rating scales. These items were averaged to form an overall index of surprise (α = .94). A 3 × 2 ANOVA on this measure revealed a significant interaction, F(1, 62) = 8.48, p < .002, but no main effects, both ps > .27. Independent of minority or majority support, the tunnel (M = 3.98) and the fluoridation (M = 3.81) issues did not elicit reactions of surprise (both ps > .23, for comparisons between minority and majority support). Surprise with the mandatory program issue used by Baker and Petty, however, was a function of group status (Ms = 3.03 and 6.67, for minority and majority support, respectively), t(62) = 3.84, p < .001, thus confirming these authors' interpretation of the effect of source-position imbalance on surprise when a majority favored the community service program. Obviously, recipients expected high consensus on disapproval for the proposal that ran counter the group's own interest.
2. After message exposure, we assessed participants' cognitive responses via a thought listing (details as in Experiment 2). Opposing respondents tended to generate less favorable thoughts (M = -.20, SD = .35) than did moderate respondents (M = -.10, SD = .33), as indicated by a marginal main effect of prior attitudes on this measure, F(1, 90) = 2.18, p = .14; for all other effects, p > .25. Because the within-subjects manipulation of argument quality prevents computing correlations between thought valence and attitude judgments for the manipulated aspects of the message, we will not discuss these data any further.
In addition, other auxiliary measures (e.g., confidence in judgments, issue involvement and importance) did not vary as a function of the independent variables, all ps > .26. Furthermore, we assessed participants' perception of the influence group on nine source perception scales, including "(not) likeable," "(not) trustworthy," "(non) expert," "(not) similar to me," and others that we adopted from relevant literature on social influence. These items were averaged to form an overall index of source perception (α = .82). Source perception was neutral (M = 5.09, on 9-point scales, SD = 1.28) and independent of our manipulations, for all effects, p > .13. Thus, the interaction of source status and prior attitude on processing effort was independent of source perception and variables such as commitment, involvement, and so forth, known to affect message processing in other settings (e.g., Heesacker, Petty, & Cacioppo, 1983; Priester & Petty, 1995) .
3. Additional measures assessed participants' source perception and confidence in their judgments (see Note 2). Source perception (α = .76) varied as a function of prior attitudes (M = 4.77 and 5.63, for opposing and moderate, respectively), F(1, 100) = 24.33, p < .001, for all other effects, F < 1; as did confidence ratings (M = 68.07% and 38.82%, on a 0% to 100% scale, for opposing and moderate, respectively), F(1, 100) = 37.17, p < .001, for all other effects, p > .11. Other than the experimentally induced prior attitudes in Experiment 1, the pre-existing attitudes in this experiment were strong enough to affect these measures. Because the effect on source perception was independent of source status, differential source perception cannot explain the interaction of prior attitudes and source status on message scrutiny. Rather, source perception was a function of pre-existing attitudes that were assessed before the actual influence attempt. Therefore, pre-existing attitudes appear to have caused differential source perception. With regard to the confidence measure, prior attitudes that are held with strong conviction are more likely to instigate conflictrelated mechanisms than moderate attitudes held with less conviction that are likely to prompt a relatively open-minded approach to the persuasive attempt. Lower confidence in moderate attitudes as compared
